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Abstract 
Many infrastructure projects have cost overruns and there has been a lot of research both on 
why these cost overruns occur and what can be done to reduce hem. Bent Flyvbjerg is the 
leading researcher in the area and in this article his proposals are used as the starting point. 
Besides a literature review, a questionnaire was sent out to experienced Swedish project 
managers to find out what they thought could reduce cost overruns. The literature review 
and the questionnaire were the foundation for the proposals formulated in this article. 
Proposals concerned three areas: (1). Organisational macro-structure, e.g. using more PPP 
projects but also decentralisation of budgets where cost overruns in one project in a region 
lead to less alternative projects in the specific region. (2). Organisational quality: It should be 
easy to see when and where cost overruns occur and who was responsible. There should be 
a well-developed knowledge management system in the organisation and an organisation 
culture of openness with a focus on improvements. (3). Organisational processes, e.g. a 
systematic use of external reviewers in different stages of a project. 
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Introduction 
Cost overruns have been a regular problem in large infrastructure projects. Flyvbjerg, 
Skamris Holm and Buhl (2003) presented results from a database with over 250 large 
projects from different countries and different time periods. The result can be summarized as 
follows: 
 86% of the projects had cost overruns compared to forecasted costs. The average 
overrun was 28%.  
 The overruns were highest in rail projects with cost overruns of 45%. For roads it was 
20%. 
 Cost overruns were somewhat lower in Europe compared to North America and 
"Other geographical areas". 
 There was no historical trend. Cost overruns in recent periods have the same 
magnitude as in earlier periods. A recent Swedish dissertation showed that there 
were large cost overruns in almost all major infrastructural projects in Sweden during 
the last decade (Lundman 2011). 
This raises two main questions: Why is this the case and what can be done about it? The 
leading researcher in this area – Bent Flyvbjerg – presents three major explanations: 
Technological factors (unforeseen technical complications), psychological factors (optimism 
bias, “an inside view” of the project) and political factors (conscious underestimation in early 
stages in order to get the project started. The different explanations and possible policies 
against cost overruns suggested by Flyvbjerg can be found in e.g. Flyvbjerg, Skamris Holm 
and Buhl (2003), Flyvbjerg (2005), Flyvbjerg  (2007),  Flyvbjerg (2008), Flyvbjerg, Garbuio 
and Lovallo (2009) and Cantarelli, Flyvbjerg, Molin,  and van Wee (2010). Brunes and Lind 
(2013) proposed a somewhat modified list that included Political/strategic factors, 
psychological factors, competence related factors and simply bad luck. 
The focus in this paper is however on the second issue: Assuming that cost overruns 
depend on a combination of the factors mentioned above – what can be done to reduce cost 
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overruns? In order to formulate a policy against cost overruns, a literature review was first 
carried out. As we were especially interested in policies that might be efficient in Sweden, a 
questionnaire was sent out to experienced project managers on both the client and 
contractor sides. This material was then used to formulate a credible policy package that 
should be able to lead to a reduction in cost overruns. This paper is therefore a combination 
of a review paper, an empirical study and a conceptual policy paper.  
Research Method 
The Literature Review 
The literature review started with the work of Bent Flyvbjerg and then focused on studies 
published in academic articles in the last 3-4 years.  The choice of Flyvbjerg should be 
uncontroversial given his large number of publications in the area of cost overruns and how 
often he is referred to. As there is so much written on cost overruns, it was decided to limit 
the analysis of other literature to the most recent studies. The idea is of course that if new 
ideas have come up they should be found in the most recent literature. Literature searches 
were made primarily through the extensive data bases available through the library at KTH 
and references found in these articles. All articles were checked carefully for statements 
about ways to reduce cost overruns and arguments for the proposals made. 
The Empirical Study about Sweden 
Beside the view from researchers covered in the literature review, we also wanted to find out 
the view of experienced project managers concerning what could be done to reduce cost 
overruns. A questionnaire was therefore sent out to two groups: project managers working 
for the Swedish Traffic Administration (STA, Trafikverket) and to senior staff in three leading 
contractor companies. The first group was found by going through current projects on the 
STA website. The experienced project managers on the contractor side was found by asking 
leading staff  in each company to recommend suitable persons that could participate in a 
questionnaire about cost overruns in infrastructure projects. It is therefore a strategic sample 
and not a stochastic sample, and this has limitations when it comes to generalizing. The 
advantage with this strategic sample is however that it was possible to choose competent 
and experienced project managers many of whom had worked on both contractor and client 
sides. Almost all of them had worked more than 10 years in the industry.  
The number of questionnaires sent out was 230 in total and the completed questionnaires 
returned were 97, giving at total response rate of 42%. As presented in Table 1 the number 
of questionnaires started was 106 and some respondents did not answer every question. 
The difference between respondents and non-respondents was checked but no systematic 
difference could be found.  
Table 1: The number of survey participants and the response rate 
 Sent out Totally started surveyed Completed Response rate 
STA-staff 190 81 74 39% 
Contractor staff 40 25 23 58% 
Total 230 106 97 42% 
The survey was constructed following some general principles. There were five possible 
answers concerning to what extent they agreed with the statements made. It was believed 
that it would be difficult for the respondents to distinguish between more alternatives. We 
used a neutral “maybe” and added a “don’t know” option in order to have an exhaustive list 
of possible answers. 
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Limitations 
As with all research methods there are limitations with questionnaires. A questionnaire is 
based on communication between the researcher and the observer. The first problem 
concerns definitions, as a questionnaire does not make it possible for the respondent to ask 
questions of the researcher on matters that seem unclear. One such matter in this paper 
might be the definition of cost overruns. To reduce this problem a definition of cost overruns 
was presented at the beginning of the questionnaire. Another problem that is discussed in 
the method literature is how respondents answer a question depending on which order it is 
given in. It could be the case that claims asked for first are given a higher positive response 
rate than claims asked for later in the questionnaire.  
Another limitation is of course the external validity; can the results be applied to 
infrastructure projects in general? The questionnaire was sent to project managers found on 
the Swedish Traffic Authorities’ website and even though it was not a random sample it 
should be representative of the population of project managers working for the STA. The 
project managers on the contractor side were chosen for their experience and even though 
they are not representative of project managers in general, they were considered to be the 
best informants concerning cost overruns. There might be some risk for bias on some 
questions and this issue will be returned to when analysing the results presented below. As 
the number of respondents is rather small, comparisons between the answers from the client 
and contractors should be seen more as indications than statistically established differences. 
Measures Proposed in the Literature 
The Measures Proposed by Flyvbjerg 
In the works of Flyvbjerg (see references below) two main ideas can be found about how the 
risk of cost overruns can be reduced. The first is reference class forecasting and the second 
is increased public sector accountability through more involvement by private parties. 
In several of the articles (e.g. Flyvbjerg 2007, 2008; Cantarelli et al. (2012)) “Reference class 
forecasting” is proposed as one way of curbing cost overruns. The method has also been 
endorsed by the American Planning Association: 
The new method achieves accuracy in projections by basing them on actual 
performance in a reference class of comparable actions (Flybjerg 2008, p 3). 
The idea is that instead of (only) doing an “inside” view prediction of the cost of a project, 
one should also take an outside view and compare with earlier similar projects. 
There seem to be two somewhat different interpretations of Reference class forecasting. 
One is that cost from earlier projects (adjusted with a price index) should be used to estimate 
the cost for the current project. One can read: 
A reference class forecast of a given planned action is based on knowledge 
about actual performance in a reference class of comparable actions already 
carried out (p 4). 
More specifically, reference class forecasting for a particular project requires 
the following three steps: 
 Identification of a relevant reference class of past, similar projects. The 
class must be broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow 
enough to be truly comparable with the specific project. 
 Establishing a probability distribution for the selected reference class. This 
requires access to credible, empirical data for a sufficient number of 
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projects within the reference class to make statistically meaningful 
conclusions. 
 Comparing the specific project with the reference class distribution, in 
order to establish the most likely outcome for the specific project.” (p 8) 
The other interpretation is that one should look at average cost overruns in earlier projects 
and then make adjustments of the initial predictions based on these historical figures. 
Flyvjerg (2008, p 11) quotes a British report: 
There is a demonstrated, systematic, tendency for project appraisers to be 
overly optimistic. To redress this tendency appraisers should make explicit, 
empirically based adjustments to the estimates of a project’s costs, benefits, 
and duration . . .[I]t is recommended that these adjustments be based on data 
from past projects or similar projects elsewhere. (HM Treasury, 2003b, p 1) 
In this context Flyvbjerg talks about providing: 
Empirically based optimism bias uplifts for selected reference classes of 
transportation infrastructure projects, and secondly, providing guidance on 
using the established uplifts to produce more realistic forecasts of capital 
expenditures in individual projects. (p 11) 
Data about such uplifts are presented in the articles. 
Our view is that this second form of reference class forecasting is very problematic as it 
would punish participants who try to improve the quality of the cost estimations. If these 
better estimations are also uplifted then these projects would seem to be especially costly 
and would then be ranked lower. In the rest of the article this form of reference class 
forecasting will therefore not be discussed. 
The second proposed policy measure is increased transparency and use of public-private 
partnerships.  
Flyvbjerg (2008, p 593) writes: 
Two basic types of accountability define liberal democracies: (1) public-sector 
accountability through transparency and public control, and (2) private-sector 
accountability via competition and market control. Both types of accountability 
may be effective tools to curb planners' misrepresentation in forecasting and to 
promote a culture which acknowledges and deals effectively with risk. 
On the first point Flyvbjerg mentions for example that central governments should not use 
project specific grants, that they should demand that predictions of costs and benefits are 
peer-reviewed and that everything should be open to public debate before decisions are 
taken. 
On the second point he mentions that economic risks should be shared between the public 
and the private sector and also with for example a local government if they have taken the 
project initiative even though most of the financing is approved at higher levels. Private 
investors should be willing to supply at least part of the capital and should receive a return 
that is related to the outcome of the predictions of costs and benefits.  
In the rest of this article Public Private Partnerships will not be discussed, not because we 
have anything against them, but that there always will be a number of projects where this 
form is not suitable or not used for political reasons. Currently in Sweden, and many other 
countries, almost all projects are procured as individual construction projects with either 
Design-Bid-Build contracts or Design-Build contracts and that is the situation that this article 
focuses on. 
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Proposals in Recent Studies of Cost Overruns 
There is a continuous flow of studies concerning cost overruns and in this section proposals 
by a number of recent studies are presented.  
Rahman et al. (2013) use a statistical method to identify causes and from that they conclude 
that site management factors are of major importance and therefore they suggest (p 1970) 
that ”improved site management and supervision of contractors can…result in control of cost 
overruns.” Most other studies however point out other factors as more important, and that 
most cost overruns occur in the design and planning stage (see Brunes and Lind (2013) for 
an overview of causes of cost overruns). Therefore measures concerning site management, 
though important, should not be expected to be efficient when considered against most cost 
overruns. 
Doloi (2013) makes a similar statistical analysis and in the concluding section he writes:  
The findings of this research highlight a new emphasis on well-developed 
technical skills as the key in controlling cost overruns in modern projects. 
Measures that focus on competence development will be returned to below. 
Two recent studies focus more directly on methods for predicting costs and risks by 
statistical analysis of earlier projects. Berechman and Chen (2011) developed a combination 
of reference class forecasting and decision tree analysis, where more or less risky 
alternatives are included. The probabilities in the decision tree analysis are derived from a 
set of observed projects. They write (p 103): 
The main conclusion from this paper is that the risk of cost overruns can, and 
should be, incorporated in transportation project evaluation and decision 
making. 
Love et al. (2013) argue for a similar approach and try to fit a statistical distribution to a set of 
actual projects with different characteristics that can then be used to predict cost overruns. 
The results are however rather disappointing and they write: 
No significant differences for cost overruns were found among procurement 
method, project type and contract size. (p 329) 
Chevroulet, Giorgi & Reynaud (2012) analyse six projects in order to find a pattern that could 
be used to predict cost overruns. This is another version of reference class forecasting. They 
also find a large divergence and write (p 301): 
The study also highlights the lack of reliable data for carrying out useful 
reference class forecasting or scenario analysis as recommended by 
Flyvbjerg. 
At the end they make a list of suggestions under three headings: 
 Before construction: Improvement in decision support. 
 During construction: Management and monitoring. 
 After construction: Feedback and consolidation of knowledge. 
In a recent Swedish report (Nilsson 2013) the following conclusions and recommendations 
concerning the Swedish Transport Administration are presented. Data on budgets and costs 
are not collected in a systematic way and this has to be changed in order to make some 
method of reference class forecasting possible (p 26). He further recommends the use of the 
Norwegian system where independent external reviews are made for projects above a 
certain size (p 27). 
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What Swedish Project Managers Think would Reduce Cost Overruns 
Background Questions 
As can be seen in Table 2, almost all project managers answered that cost overruns occur 
often or sometimes in infrastructure projects. More than half of the respondents answered 
that cost overruns occur often. Of the project managers from STA, 89% had experienced 
projects where there had been cost overruns and 96% of the project managers on the 
contractor side had similar experience of cost overruns in projects.  
Table 2: Question. What is your view on the prevalence of cost overruns in infrastructure 
projects? 
 Q1 (Client staff) Q2 (Contractor staff) Q1 + Q2 
Occurs often 41  (52%) 13  (52%) 54 (52%) 
Occurs sometimes 34  (43%) 12  (48%) 46 (44%) 
Occurs rarely   3  ( 4%) 0 3 (3%) 
Do not know   1  ( 1%) 0 1 (1%) 
Number of answers 79 25 104 
The Role of Procurement Form 
The respondents were presented with a number of statements and asked to choose from a 
number of alternative answers. The first question related to a current debate in Sweden 
about the role of the procurement forms Design Bid Build versus Design Build. Among the 
STA-staff changing from Design Bid Build was not expected to reduce cost overruns, while 
the contractors had a more positive view of the effects of changing procurement type (see 
Table 3). There might however be some bias in the answers on this question as a number of 
contractor companies have argued strongly for increased use of Design Build contracts (see 
e.g. www.ncc.se). 
Table 3: Statement. Cost overruns would be considerably less if Design Build would be used 
instead of Design Bid Build? 
 Q1 Q2 Q1+Q2 
Yes, definitely 0   3 (12%) 3 (3%) 
Yes, probably 8 (10%) 9  (38%) 17 (17%) 
Maybe 21  (27%) 6   (25%) 27 (27%) 
No, probably not 28  ( 36%) 5   (21%) 33 (33%) 
No, definitely not 14  (18%) 1  (4%) 19 (19%) 
Don´t know 6    (8%) 0 6 (6%) 
Number of answers 77 24 101 
The Role of External Reviewers 
As was reported in the literature review above, several researchers recommend the use of 
external reviewers to reduce both psychological and political/strategic bias. This idea does 
not get strong general support, but there are large differences between the groups as 50% of 
the respondents from the contractor side support the statement while the share is 28% on 
the client side (see Table 4). Here there might also be some bias in the answers, especially 
from the client side, as the use of external reviewers could be seen as a criticism of their 
work. 
Resources Spent in Early Stages and Risk Analysis 
The technological explanation of cost overruns suggests that if more resources are spent on 
technical investigations in the early stages, then there would be fewer surprises and a 
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reduction in cost overruns later in the project. The answers are presented in Table 5 below. 
The statement gets considerably more support than the questions above, especially on the 
contractor side where 50% strongly agree with the statement. The fourth question was 
similar and dealt with risk analysis, as shown in Table 6. This is also seen as a measure that 
will reduce cost overruns, and also here the contractors are more positive. 
Table 4: Statement. Cost overruns would be considerably less if the client let external 
reviewers evaluate the project and calculation in advance 
 Q1 Q2 Q1+Q2 
Yes, definitely 4   (5%) 3 (12%) 7   (7%) 
Yes, probably 18 (23%) 9 (38%) 27 (27%) 
Maybe 30 (39%) 7 (29%) 37 (37%) 
No, probably not 24 ( 31%) 4 (17%) 28 (28%) 
No, definitely not 1   (1%) 1 (4%) 2   (2%) 
Don´t know 0 0  
Number of answers 77 24 101 
Table 5: Statement. Cost overruns would be considerably less if the client put more 
resources into technical investigations early in the project 
 Q1 Q2 Q1 + Q2 
Yes, definitely 19  (25%) 12 (50%) 31 (31%) 
Yes, probably 36 (47%) 11  (46%) 47 (47%) 
Maybe 13 (17%) 1   (4%) 14 (14%) 
No, probably not 9  ( 12%) 0 9 (9%) 
No, definitely not 0  0  
Don´t know 0 0  
Number of answers 77 24 101  
Table 6: Statement. Cost overruns would be considerably less if the client puts more 
resources into evaluation of risks early in the project 
 Q1 Q2 Q1 + Q2 
Yes, definitely 9   (12%) 8   (33%) 17 (17%) 
Yes, probably 38 (49%) 13 (54%) 51 (51%) 
Maybe 25 (32%) 2   (8%) 27 (27%) 
No, probably not 5  ( 6%) 1   (4%) 6  (6%) 
No, definitely not 0  0  
Don´t know 0 0  
Number of answers 77 24 101 
Incentives  
The next question dealt with consequences for those responsible for the cost overruns; see 
Table 7. The idea behind the question is that if the persons directly involved in the design 
and the cost calculations would for example risk being fired if there were cost overruns that 
would affect the quality of their work. As can be seen below, this idea does not get much 
support and the difference between the groups is small. 
Overview of the Policies  
Simplifying the answers to “Yes”, “No”, “Maybe” and “Do not know” the result from the survey 
can be summarized as shown in Table 8. Project managers in Sweden regard better 
technical investigation and better risk analysis as good policies against cost overruns. The 
majority do not regard the use of Design Build procurements as a cure for cost overruns. 
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The opinions were divided concerning the effects on cost overruns of using external 
reviewers and introducing stronger consequences for those responsible.  
 
Table 7: Statement. Cost overruns would be considerably less if it hard larger consequences 
for those responsible 
 Q1 Q2 Q1 + Q2
Yes, definitely 7   (9%) 3  (12%) 10 (10%) 
Yes, probably 17 (22%) 3  (12%) 20 (20%) 
Maybe 17 (22%) 4  (17%) 21 (21%) 
No, probably not 29 (38%) 9  (38%) 38 (38%) 
No, definitely not 3   (4%) 3  (12%) 6 (6%) 
Don´t know 4   (5%) 2  (8%) 6 (6%) 
Number of answers 77 24 101 
 
Table 8: Simplified overview of the results 
Factor Yes No Maybe Do not 
know
Amount of 
respondent 
Use Design Bid Build 20% 47% 27% 6% 101 
Use external reviewers 34% 30% 36% 0 101 
More resources to technical 
investigation 
77% 9% 14% 0 101 
More resources on risk evaluation 67% 6% 27% 0 101 
Stronger consequences for those 
involved 
30% 43% 21% 6% 101 
Other Policy Measures  
At the end of the questionnaire was an open question where the respondents could present 
other policies that they believed would be efficient against cost overruns: See Table 9. Some 
of the factors mentioned actually overlapped with the policies mentioned in the questions 
and have therefore been excluded in the list below. It is interesting to note that competence 
related factors are mentioned by both sides. 
Table 9: Other measures that can reduce cost overruns  
Factors mentioned by Transport Authority staff Factors mentions by Contractor Staff 
Better educated politicians that think more in long 
term 
Better documents, better control of 
documents 
Budgets should not be set before design is 
determined 
Higher margins for unpredicted costs in 
the budgets 
Increased quality of design documents, more 
controls of implementation 
Increase client competence 
Higher client competence concerning calculation More contacts between client and 
contractor in the early stages More continuous monitoring of projects, more 
centrally controller internal reviews, faster reaction 
when signs of cost overruns 
More feedback, less prestige 
More cooperation between client and contractor 
(partnering) 
Bonus systems for those involved 
Change the procurement process, less on lowest 
price, more on documented competence 
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A Policy Package against Cost Overruns 
The aim of this section is to give a systematic overview of what could be recommended as a 
structured policy package against cost overruns from a public sector perspective. The list is 
based on both the measures recommended in the earlier literature and on the results from 
the questionnaire, but also on more general views about what drives an organization. The 
measures will be grouped in three broad categories: Organizational macro-structure, 
Organizational quality and Organizational processes.  
It should however be stressed that reducing cost overruns is not the only important target.  
Mandell and Brunes (2014) show that there might be a rational and efficient procurement 
process that cause side-effects in which cost overruns might occur. As argued in Warsame, 
Lind & Borg (2013) the quality of the final product is of course also important.  
Organizational Macro-Structure 
One example of measures on this level is Flyvbjerg´s proposal to carry out more projects as 
PPP-projects. A more radical solution would be to go in the direction of more complete 
privatization of infrastructure facilities, where the private sector both invest and are free to 
charge the customer as in any other market.   
Organizational changes within the public sector can also affect the incentives to reduce cost 
overruns. Hasselgren (2013) discusses different ways to approach decision making and 
budgeting in the public sector and contrasts two alternatives. The first is based on welfare 
economics where projects are evaluated with a social cost benefit analysis and then paid 
with general taxes. The second is based on Coase´s criticism of the welfare economics 
model and proposes that each sector should pay its own costs. Roads are paid with car 
taxes or example. This means that if there are cost overruns in one road project, these taxes 
have to be raised or other road projects will be postponed, while in the welfare economics 
based model the cost is spread over the whole population. The incentives to reduce cost 
overruns would therefore be weaker in the welfare economics model. The same argument 
can be used for delegating resources for public investment budgets to regions, such as an 
infrastructure investment grant to a region on a per capita basis, and then let the regions 
decide on the projects. In that way a cost overrun in one project in the region means that 
other projects in the same region would have to be postponed. The common idea behind 
these two proposals is to move the consequences of the cost overruns closer to the decision 
maker and thereby strengthen incentives to avoid cost overruns and thus reduce the risk for 
primarily strategic/political manipulations. 
Organizational Quality 
What can be seen in both our questionnaire and in other studies is that procurement type 
does not seem to be a very important issue in the context of cost overruns: Both Design-
Build and Design-Bid-Build can lead to cost overruns, and this is not surprising from the 
perspective of the next group of factors: Organizational quality. This can be subdivided into a 
number of interrelated aspects (see Warsame, Lind & Borg 2013 for a similar approach, but 
where the focus is on quality problem and not cost overruns): 
“Order in the bookkeeping”. Several Swedish studies e.g. Riksrevisionen (2010, 2011 a,b) 
and Nilsson (2013) show that it is not easy to find out  how much projects really cost and 
during what stage cost overruns occur. Without this basic data any kind of reference class 
forecasting would be impossible and a minimum demand of an organization is that it be able 
to present what various projects have cost in the past and why there have been cost 
overruns in earlier projects. Brunes and Lind (2013) present a framework that can be used 
for this purpose. 
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“Knowing who did what”. If it is not possible to know who was responsible for carrying out 
certain tasks, or approving certain calculations, then it is also not possible to know who has 
a good track record and who has a bad track record.  Even if the questionnaire did not give 
strong support for idea of increasing the individual consequences of cost overruns, this 
aspect seems important from a transaction cost theory perspective where individual utility 
maximizing based on expected consequences is a fundamental idea. 
“Knowledge management”. This is a growing area in many sectors of the economy, (see 
Ilina (2011) for an overview).   If we look at knowledge management from the perspective of 
cost overruns it concerns: 
 Systematic evaluation of earlier projects and finding patterns that can make it easier 
to see what can lead to cost overruns in specific projects and what can be done to 
avoid this in coming projects. This is of course the core aim in reference class 
forecasting. 
 Collecting information about other organizations experiences, e.g. traffic agencies in 
other countries.  
 Recruitment of staff with the right combination of training and experience. 
 Policies to develop the competence of the staff. Increased competence was also 
seen as important by many respondents in the questionnaire. 
“Organization culture”. Ravasi and Schultz (2006) define organizational culture as a set of 
shared mental assumptions that guide interpretation and action in organizations by defining 
appropriate behaviour for various situations. Without an organizational culture that promotes 
openness and a continuous focus on improvements, it will be difficult to implement the more 
specific measures that have cost overruns as their target. There have to be clear signals and 
behaviour consistent with these signals from the top management and – for government 
authorities – from leading politicians. 
Organizational Processes 
Here the focus is on processes directly aimed at reducing the risk of cost overruns in specific 
projects and one proposal discussed in the literature, that also seems logical given the 
different theories about the causes of cost overruns, is the use of external reviews. Some 
countries (see Nilsson 2013) already use this for large projects, but our view is that it can be 
used in all kinds of projects and in all stages. 
In smaller projects the use of experienced persons within the organization in a more informal 
review process concerning both design, technical investigations and cost calculations is one 
way or reducing risks related to lack of competence, cognitive biases and strategic 
manipulation. One can think of a hierarchy of projects related to size and technical 
complexity and where different types of experts – from the consultancy sector or from the 
academic world both nationally and internationally – can be involved to provide second 
opinions in more or less formalized ways. More information in all stages of the projects can 
also be made publicly available on the organizations’ websites, and thereby make feedback 
possible. 
Concluding Comments 
Policy proposals are based on predictions of the effects of various actions, and it is well 
known that predictions in complex environments are always uncertain. There can be 
complex interactions and unexpected consequences. Our belief, based on the arguments 
and studies presented, is that the proposed system of measures presented above would be 
efficient. But is important to continuously revaluate what really happens when a new policy is 
introduced. An experimental approach where different methods are tested in different 
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projects can be a rational strategy when there is uncertainty about the effects of a policy. 
This is a part of the organizational culture and maybe that is the most important issue. 
The proposals above are directed at different types of practitioners. Organizational macro-
structure is decided by policy makers at the central government level, even if some of them 
can be introduced independently at regional levels. Organizational quality and organizational 
processes are, on the other hand, primarily issues for boards and top management in 
government authorities, but it could also be argued that it is the responsibility of everyone in 
an organization to contribute to transparency and efficiency.   
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